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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) made headlines in 
December 2010 when its staff released a “Proposed Framework” for 
privacy protection on the Internet.1  Most of the attention was 
drawn by a controversial “do not track” proposal that could 
significantly restrict the surreptitious collection and use of personal 
information obtained from individuals browsing online.2  Relatively 
little attention was paid to other parts of the report, which for the 
most part continue the FTC’s emphasis on self-regulation and its 
preference for notice and choice regimes over mandatory privacy 
norms.   
 
       †     Professor of Law and Cleon H. Foust Fellow, Indiana University School of 
Law-Indianapolis. 
 1. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010) 
[hereinafter PROPOSED FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12
/101201privacyreport.pdf.  
 2. Id. at 63–69. 
1
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This article argues that the FTC, and Congress if necessary, 
should recognize that a notice and choice approach to privacy 
protection is not likely to protect consumer interests in most 
modern day settings.  Indeed, policy makers may be doing more 
harm than good by continuing to focus on notice and choice, 
thereby giving a misleading impression that privacy is being 
protected when it is not.  Moreover, by adhering to a notice and 
choice regime, they avoid discussing the more difficult yet most 
fundamental questions in the privacy debate.  Under what 
circumstances is data collection likely to harm individuals, and 
when is it benign?  If a practice is reasonably likely to cause harm, 
what is the most effective way to prevent the harm from occurring?  
Even if data collection causes no direct harm, should it still be 
limited if it undermines other values, such as personal autonomy, 
or should we just accept that our lives are increasingly an open 
book? 
When reviewing the Proposed Framework, one should keep in 
mind the agency’s history in this area.  For more than two decades, 
the FTC has struggled to formulate an effective and coherent 
approach to regulating privacy as information technologies 
advance at a rapid pace.  Beginning in the late 1990s, the agency 
conducted studies on consumer privacy preferences and business 
privacy practices online.3  The studies confirmed that a vast amount 
of personal information was being collected without consumer 
knowledge or consent, and use of that data often did not conform 
to the expectations and preferences of most individuals.4  The 
disconnection between individual preferences and business 
practices prompted the FTC to call for national legislation to 
mandate fair information policies on the Internet by the end of the 
twentieth century.5   
Following stiff resistance from the online business community 
and a change in FTC leadership in 2001, the agency quieted its 
calls for privacy mandates and, instead, moved to encourage 
 
 3.  In 2000, the FTC concluded that industry measures were far from 
adequate and that national privacy legislation was needed.  See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC 
MARKETPLACE 38 (2000) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE 2000], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf. 
 4.  Id. at 2, 9–10. 
 5.  Id. at 36–38 (“The proposed legislation would set forth a basic level of 
privacy protection for all visitors to consumer-oriented commercial Web sites . . . 
.”). 
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industry self-regulation.6  The move saw some initial success.  The 
continuing threat of legislative or regulatory mandates was serious 
enough for large online firms to implement voluntary privacy 
practices and publish privacy policies that explained, at least in 
general terms, what types of information were being collected and 
how that information was used.  Although smaller online firms 
were initially reluctant to follow, many changed their policies after 
several large firms announced that they would no longer advertise 
or link to websites that did not publish their privacy policies.7 
The FTC lauded this move toward greater transparency in its 
market-driven solution.8  Privacy policies could be found on 
countless websites and they fostered an impression among the 
general public that most websites collected only information that 
was needed for internal purposes, that the personal information 
would not be sold, traded, or used for other purposes, and that 
adequate security measures were in place.  When the policies were 
read, however, there was often little privacy protection being 
promised.  Thus, despite the proliferation of privacy policies 
online, consumers’ privacy interests were no better protected than 
they were the decade before.   
The FTC took a similar approach in other areas where 
emerging technologies were raising privacy concerns.  In 2005, the 
FTC encouraged a self-regulatory privacy regime that focused 
largely on disclosure of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
 
 6. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Privacy 2001 
Conference: Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001) 
[hereinafter Muris, The Privacy 2001 Conference], available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm(concluding that it is too soon for the FTC to 
fashion workable legislation to address strong consumer privacy concerns); see also 
Challenges Facing the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th 
Cong. 10–34 (2001) (testimony of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n), available at http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107h/76308.pdf 
(noting a majority of the Commission did not support online privacy legislation at 
that time and the FTC’s focus would remain on the enforcement of current laws). 
 7. Jon G. Auerbach, To Get IBM Ad, Sites Must Post Privacy Policies, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 31, 1999, at B1. 
 8. See Muris, The Privacy 2001 Conference, supra note 6 (“One of the 
agency’s successes has been encouraging Internet sites to post privacy notices.”).  
Indeed, in 1998, only two percent of all sites had some form of privacy notices.  
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.  By 2000, virtually all of the 
most popular commercial websites had privacy notices.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PRIVACY ONLINE 2000, supra note 3, at 10. 
3
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presence and consumer choice on the subject of the expanding use 
of RFID technologies in retail and other consumer settings:  
Commission staff agrees that industry initiatives can play 
an important role in addressing privacy concerns raised by 
certain RFID applications.  The staff believes that the goal of 
such programs should be transparency.  For example, when a 
retailer provides notice to consumers about the presence of RFID 
tags, the notice should be clear, conspicuous, and accurate.  The 
notice should advise consumers if an RFID tag or reader is 
present and if the technology is being used to collect 
personally identifiable information about consumers.  
This clarity is particularly important when a disclosure 
concerns an unfamiliar technology, as is the case with 
RFID.  Similarly, if a company’s program provides 
consumers with the option of removing the RFID tag, the 
company’s practices should make that option easy to 
exercise by consumers.9 
EPCglobal, an industry-sponsored organization created to 
promote worldwide adoption and standardization of the Electronic 
Product Code (an essential part of RFID technology in its current 
form), adopted “Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products” in 
2005.10  Consistent with the FTC’s approach, the Guidelines call for 
consumer notice and education about RFID use in consumer 
transactions, but little in the form of substantive controls on the 
collection and use of information.11  Privacy and civil liberties 
 
 9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 22–23 (2005) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050308rfidrpt.pdf.  Legislators in 
several states and the U.S. Congress have introduced legislation requiring that 
consumers be notified when RFID tags and readers are present in public locations, 
but no laws have been enacted to date.  See Laura Hilder, Defusing the Threat of 
RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through Technology-Specific Legislation at the State 
Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 151–52 (2006) (exploring RFID technology 
and legislation strategies to protect consumer privacy); Kyle Sommer, Riding the 
Wave: The Uncertain Future of RFID Legislation, 35 J. LEGIS. 48, 68–70 (2009) 
(analyzing privacy concerns and legislation specific to RFID technology).  
 10.  Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products, GS1US.ORG, 
http://www.gs1us.org/epcglobal_us/consumer_awareness/guidelines_on_epc_for
_consumer_products (last visited April 16, 2011). 
 11. Under the Guidelines, companies using RFID tags on products or 
packaging should include a label or identifier indicating the presence of the tag.  
See id.  EPCglobal has developed a template label that companies can use to 
inform consumers of the presence of RFID tags.  Retailers Tool Kit, GS1.ORG, 
http://www.gs1.org/epcglobal/public_policy/retailers_tool_kit (follow “Images” 
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).  The template label discloses that a 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/9
  
2011] THE FTC’S PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 1731 
groups maintained that in many circumstances it is insufficient 
simply to notify consumers that RFID technology is being 
employed.  Both the Center for Democracy and Technology and 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center encouraged a stronger 
privacy protection regime, particularly when data collected through 
RFID technology can be stored and linked to personal information 
about an individual collected either through the RFID system itself 
or in combination with other databases.12  Their complaints went 
unheeded by EPCglobal, the FTC, Congress, and most state 
legislatures.   
With respect to behavioral advertising online, in 2009 the FTC 
issued a staff report supporting the development of stronger self-
regulatory privacy practices, focusing again on the disclosure of 
privacy practices and the opportunity for consumers to opt-out of 
certain behavioral advertising practices on websites that use them.13  
Except for the collection and use of highly sensitive information, 





particular product or package contains an RFID tag that in most cases may be 
discarded by a consumer after purchase.  Id.  The Guidelines’ second 
requirement, “Consumer Choice,” provides that consumers should be “informed 
of the choices that are available to discard or remove or in the future disable RFID 
tags from the products they acquire.”  See Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products, 
GS1US.ORG, supra note 10.  The Guidelines explain that, “for most products, the 
EPC tags would be part of disposable packaging or would be otherwise 
discardable.”  Id.  The third prong of the Guidelines provides that consumers 
should have “the opportunity easily to obtain accurate information about EPC and 
its applications.”  Id.  The Guidelines state that companies using EPC in a 
consumer setting should “familiarise consumers with the EPC logo and . . . help 
consumers understand the technology and its benefits.”  Id.  More information 
about the template label is available on the EPCglobal website, along with an 
explanation of RFID technology for consumers.   
 12. CDT Working Group on RFID: Privacy Best Practices for Deployment of RFID 
Technology, CDT.ORG, http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20060501rfid-best-practices.php 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2011); GUIDELINES ON COMMERCIAL USE OF RFID TECHNOLOGY, 
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. 2–4 (2004), available at http://epic.org/privacy/rfid
/rfid_gdlnes-070904.pdf.  
 13. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL 
ADVERTISING (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02
/P085400behavadreport.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 42 (“[C]ompanies should only collect sensitive data for behavioral 
advertising after they obtain affirmative express consent from the consumer to 
receive the advertising.”). 
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When the FTC released the new Proposed Framework at the 
end of 2010 after it had conducted several workshops and solicited 
comments from stakeholders, including many privacy advocates, 
some hoped that the agency would signal a shift in its approach 
and advocate mandatory privacy norms with less reliance on notice 
and consent.  While it is still unclear what direction the agency 
intends to move, except for the “do not track” proposal, the report 
largely maintains the status quo.15  There is a noticeable change in 
rhetoric, which may portend a different strategy down the road, but 
little more.  Signaling what could be a move toward stronger 
substantive privacy mandates in the future, the report states that 
“companies should adopt a ‘privacy by design’ approach by 
building privacy protections into their everyday business 
practices.”16  Companies should maintain reasonable security for 
consumer data, collect only the data needed for a specific purpose, 
retain data only as long as necessary, and implement reasonable 
procedures to promote data accuracy.17  The agency recognized 
that “[s]uch concepts are not new,”18 but the Proposed Framework 
suggests that a company’s failure to take such measures could 
attract agency attention.  It remains to be seen whether the agency 
will develop rules or guidelines to implement the “privacy by 
design” concept and bring enforcement actions under its 
unfairness jurisdiction to demonstrate that “privacy by design” 
implies justiciable standards—not merely laudatory goals.   
Most of the other proposals assume that notice and choice 
should be the dominant approach to privacy protection online, and 
that the model need only be improved at the margins to be more 
effective.  For example, the report proposes that companies 
provide choices to consumers about their data practices in a 
simpler form that would be easier to understand.19  Consumers 
 
 15. The “do not track” proposal, while controversial, does not signal a 
significant shift away from notice and consent.  It is one application of a notice 
and consent approach that allows individuals to opt-out of data sharing by using a 
browser utility that would block certain data collection functions.  PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 66.  It is only controversial because it makes opting 
out of data collection much easier than other largely unsuccessful notice and 
consent mechanisms that require considerably more effort to (a) realize that there 
is some disclosure and an opt-out opportunity, and (b) navigate the steps 
necessary to exercise the option. 
 16. Id. at v (citation omitted).  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 52–53. 
6
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should be able to make more “informed and meaningful choices” 
about what information they share and with whom.20  Opt-out 
opportunities should be more clearly described and offered at a 
time when the consumer is making a decision about disclosing 
personal information.21  Privacy policies should be “clear, concise, 
and easy-to-read.”22  The assumption is that if consumers can better 
understand privacy notices and are given more opportunities to 
make informed choices about sharing information, their interests 
will be adequately safeguarded.  The guiding principle is that there 
is an effective market for information sharing that can be enhanced 
by better disclosure and more opportunities for people to make 
information sharing choices; for example, consumers could make 
informed decisions about revealing information as they interact 
with online firms.23 
The ongoing effort to tweak the notice and choice model is 
not surprising.  Since the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) guidelines on privacy in 1980, notice 
and choice regimes have been recognized as the central part of fair 
information practices regardless of the technology being used to 
collect and store data.24  The generally accepted norms guiding the 
regime are openness and transparency in the collection, storage, 
and use of personal information, and faith in the ability of people 
to act in their best interests.  It assumes that consumers can assert 
their privacy preferences if they are given sufficient information. 
While notice and choice may have been a viable approach to 
protecting privacy in 1980, it is no longer viable following three 
decades of technological advancement that have brought us to the 
point where we have access to information whenever we want it, 
wherever we happen to be, and with the ability to share it almost 
instantaneously with anyone we choose.  Giving consumers 
opportunities to opt-out of information sharing does not justify 
 
 20. Id. at vi. 
 21. Id. at 57. 
 22. Id. at vii.  See generally George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan & Henry Greene, A 
Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy Notice Readability, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 238 (2006) (evaluating the readability of 312 online privacy notices 
and arguing that such readability should be improved as a matter of marketing 
and public policy). 
 23. See Milne, Culnan & Greene, supra note 22, at 238. 
 24. See, e.g., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND 
TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980) (recognizing the importance of 
notice and disclosure for privacy concerns internationally). 
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excessive data collection, transfers of personal information to 
others for uses not contemplated by the individual who revealed it, 
or failure to create and maintain reasonable storage security 
measures.  Notice and choice must be supplanted by responsible 
information practices throughout the data collection and storage 
process, mandated by law if necessary.  The FTC’s approach to 
privacy is essentially backwards: a privacy regime should be most 
concerned with limiting the collection and dissemination of 
personal information in the first place because once the 
information is collected its subsequent use cannot be controlled.  
Questions of informed consent should only be considered at the 
margins. 
Under the FTC’s self-regulatory principles, protecting 
consumer privacy is largely the responsibility of individuals who are 
expected to learn about the privacy practices of data collectors and 
take steps to minimize privacy risks.25  This self-policing model 
could be made effective by enhanced notice and choice 
opportunities if individuals were capable of protecting their privacy 
preferences.  Unfortunately, for many reasons, they are not. 
I. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY MAKES DECISION MAKING PURE 
GUESSWORK 
The data collection, storage, and manipulation industry is 
becoming more sophisticated and less transparent every day.  The 
vast majority of data collection and sharing practices occur outside 
public view.26  Our personal information is stored, searched, and 
transmitted every day; yet, we have no idea what the ramifications 
may be (good or bad) or what decisions are being made in reliance 
on it.  If we do not understand what is going on behind the scenes, 
then information practices that many of us would object to will 
largely go undetected.27  No matter how much notice we are given, 
 
 25. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 40 (“For example, although the 
proposed framework provides for notice and choice, it aims to simplify how 
companies present such notice and choice and to reduce the degree to which 
privacy protection depends on them.”).  
 26. See generally Victoria Bellotti, Design for Privacy in Multimedia Computing and 
Communications, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 63, 64–66 
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (discussing how ubiquitous 
computing and new user-friendly interfaces obscure data collecting intrusions on 
privacy).  
 27. Cf. Robert LaRose & Nora J. Rifon, Promoting i-Safety: Effects of Privacy 
Warnings and Privacy Seals on Risk Assessment and Online Privacy Behavior, 41 J.  
8
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we cannot evaluate the risk of potential harms, make informed 
decisions, seek redress, or stop harms from recurring because we 
cannot comprehend the benefits or the risks at the time when a 
decision has to be made.28  
II. VALUING PRIVACY IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE 
Even with more information and choices available, individuals 
cannot effectively value their personal information.  Notice and 
choice solutions presume that we can value our privacy rights in 
some meaningful way.29  Only then can we make self-interested 
choices about whether and how to share information, and whether 
to take the time or expend the effort to safeguard that information.  
When it is impossible to know where our information will end up 
and how it will be used, it is difficult to assess the risks associated 
with releasing information or failing to monitor its use once we 
have given someone access to it.  We might think we are only 
providing harmless facts and boring details, and we may perceive 
the risk as small compared to the benefits being offered by a data 
collector, not knowing how or when the seemingly harmless 
information might be shared or used in a way that will cause us 
harm.30  There is a high degree of information asymmetry; 
collectors of information know what they intend to do with the 
data, but individuals who provide the data do not.31  Under these 
 
CONSUMER AFF. 127, 128 (2007) (suggesting that consumers do not understand the 
implications of sharing personal information because of inadequate privacy 
policies and seals). 
 28.  See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online 
Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 103 (2002) (“Once an individual has sold 
her personal information, she loses much control over it. . . . Because of the 
immense amounts of data about any given individual already in the public 
domain, how would that individual verify when a contract was broken?”). 
 29. See generally Curt J. Dommeyer & Barbara J. Gross, What Consumers Know 
and What They Do: An Investigation of Consumer Knowledge, Awareness, and Use of 
Privacy Protection Strategies, 17 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 34 (2003) (discussing a 
study on consumer awareness and use of privacy protection strategies). 
 30. See LaRose & Rifon, supra note 27, at 129 (“Internet privacy poses 
something of a paradox, some say even a fallacy.  Surveys show that concerns about 
online privacy are widespread. . . . [But] Internet users willingly divulge personal 
information to obtain ‘free’ information, personalized content, customized 
discounts, prizes, loyalty program memberships, cajoling interactions with 
automated shopping ‘agents,’ or some other form of  ‘fair exchange.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 31.  See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 1992) 
(providing a microeconomic analysis of how asymmetric information affects 
9
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conditions, individuals may undervalue (or overvalue) its release 
because they are unaware of the risks and benefits.  Because they 
have no basis for valuing their information, decisions will nearly 
always be less than optimal. 
III. AGGREGATION OF DATA IMPOSES UNKNOWABLE RISKS 
A related problem is the difficulty in valuing specific pieces of 
personal information out of context.  How does one value one’s 
holiday shopping habits?  To value this information with even 
rough accuracy (e.g., assess the risk of future harm resulting from 
someone having access to the data), one needs to know how the 
information will be used.  The information might be sold to a 
marketing firm in the aggregate (along with data from other 
anonymous shoppers) without any personal identification, in which 
case its value to any particular person is nominal because the risks 
of future harm are small.  Opting out of such data sharing is totally 
unnecessary, and from a societal point of view, the decision is 
inefficient because it deprives the data collector of potentially 
useful information while not remotely benefiting the individual.  
On the other hand, if the information is transferred and 
aggregated with other information that can link the data to an 
individual, we might value it much higher.  If a person thought it 
could lead to identity theft, the information might not be released 
at any price.32  The problem is that once information is stored and 
is capable of being accessed, we lose control over its use, and we 
seldom have enough knowledge to evaluate the risk of future harm.  





behaviors and strategic interactions between persons). 
 32. Cf. Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the 
Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 661 (1999) (describing identity theft methods and the importance of 
one’s identity).  See generally Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New 
Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423 (2001) (describing how identity theft occurs and 
ways to prevent it). 
10
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IV. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY RENDERS PRIVACY DECISIONS 
LESS MEANINGFUL 
There are insurmountable accountability problems with 
today’s data collection and sharing practices.  Tracing harm to a 
particular source or data breach will usually be impossible.  If a 
person is affected in some way by the unexpected misuse of 
personal information, even noticing the problem may be difficult, 
and tracing the problem to a particular release of information will 
be nearly impossible because information about us resides in so 
many databases.33  Without accountability, market forces cannot 
effectively curb wrongful behavior.  Moreover, injury resulting from 
data collection and sharing, while economic in some cases, can be 
impossible to undo even if it is discovered and traced to a 
particular source.  Many injuries resulting from identity theft, lost 
employment opportunities, and reputation damage cannot be 
compensated even if the harmful information can be traced to a 
particular source.  Most importantly, without accountability, 
individuals faced with decisions about sharing personal 
information are left essentially with two unappealing choices: (1) 
prohibit the release of information wherever possible because one 
never knows where it will end up; or (2) do not be concerned with 
the release of information because such collection and use is 
inevitable and injuries are untraceable, so you can expect no 
redress for any adverse effects.  With either decision, the choice is 
ill-informed and not likely to be consistent with the best interests of 
the individual. 
V. ACCURATE CHOICES ARE COMPROMISED BY COMPETING 
GOALS 
When making decisions about whether to divulge personal 
information, people compromise between their desire for complete 
accuracy (balancing the costs and benefits of the decision) and 
their desire to achieve other rational goals.34  Other than 
 
 33. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 28, at 103 (“How do I know, for 
example, where a firm obtained my email address?  Was it from me or some other 
available source that was legal?  Vast amounts of personal data are already in the 
public domain.  Consider, for example, telephone directories, employee 
personnel databases, credit reports, and other public or semi-public sources.”). 
 34. Cf. Ellen C. Garbarino & Julie A. Edell, Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice, 
24 J. CONSUMER RES. 147, 148 (1997) (examining cognitive effort and its influence 
11
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maximizing the accuracy of the decision, another important 
decision-making goal is the minimization of cognitive effort.35  
When making decisions, people tend to expend only as much 
effort as they need to reach what they perceive is a satisfactory 
decision, even if it is not optimal.36  Unless the decision is of great 
importance, people tend to make choices that are easier to 
implement, though less accurate, because important factors are left 
out of the decision-making process.37  Thus, giving individuals more 
disclosure and better opportunities to opt-out of information 
sharing is not likely to lead to more accurate decisions.  Except for 
the most obviously sensitive information, people are not likely to 
expend the cognitive effort necessary to weigh the pros and cons.  
They will not perceive the stakes being high enough, so they will 
not even try to make a decision that serves their best interests.   
VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS MAKE PRIVACY LESS SALIENT  
Even when someone wants to evaluate privacy alternatives and 
make self-interested decisions, practical problems create obstacles 
that impede optimal decision making.  The most important are 
time constraints.  When people feel that they should make a 
decision quickly, people switch from more careful decision-making 
strategies to simpler ones that result in a faster decision.38  While 
 
on choice outcomes).  See generally Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer 
Rationality? Some Consumer Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81 (2000) (examining the limitations of rational choice 
theories); Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy 
Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 100 (2007) (discussing the privacy paradox and public policy about 
preserving one’s sense of privacy). 
 35. James R. Bettman, Mary Frances Luce, & John W. Payne, Constructive 
Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 192–93 (1998) (providing a 
framework for understanding constructive consumer choice). 
 36. Garbarino & Edell, supra note 34, at 148.  
 37. Id. at 149; see Eric J. Johnson, John W. Payne & James R. Bettman, 
Information Displays and Preference Reversals, 42 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 1, 2 (1988) (discussing the frequency and occurrence of preference 
reversals and implications for information displays); Denis A. Lussier & Richard W. 
Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 154, 154 (1979) (reporting results of a study on consumer choice strategy). 
 38. See also Bettman, Luce & Payne, supra note 35, at 200 (discussing the 
effects of time pressure on choice processes); Peter Wright, The Harassed Decision 
Maker: Time Pressures, Distractions, and the Use of Evidence, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 555 
(1974) (studying the effects of time pressure and distraction on an individual’s 
decision-making process).  See generally John W. Payne, James R. Bettman & Mary 
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there may be plenty of time to read the privacy practices of each 
website visited and make a choice about information sharing on 
each one, to do so would frustrate one of the principal benefits of 
going online—a fast and convenient way to learn, communicate, 
and purchase goods and services.  Surfing the Internet would take 
forever if the privacy practices and opt-out procedures were 
explored at each site.  Regardless of time constraints, as people 
make choices about whether and how to interact with a particular 
website, privacy concerns have to be perceived as important 
enough to capture their attention.  If other attributes of the site are 
deemed more important (e.g., site content, ease of use, desirable 
interactive features), privacy alternatives are not likely to be 
explored before information is shared with the site. 
VII. BEHAVIORAL HEURISTICS IMPACT PRIVACY CHOICES   
Several behavioral factors make it unlikely that decisions about 
information sharing will be made with an accurate balancing of the 
benefits and risks. 
Inferences play an important role in a person’s decision 
whether to share information, yet they often lead to inaccurate 
privacy choices.  If the information necessary to making an 
informed decision is difficult to obtain, people infer the missing 
information from information that is more readily available.  
People may assume that a particular attribute is similar across 
brands (e.g., the privacy practices of all banks are probably about 
the same), or people may infer a value that corresponds to the 
values they assign to other attributes of the party with whom they 
are interacting (e.g., if my personal banker is trustworthy and 
caring, the bank’s privacy practices are likely trustworthy as well).39  
 
Frances Luce, When Time Is Money: Decision Behavior Under Opportunity-Cost Time 
Pressure, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 131 (1996), available at 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jrb12/bio/Jim/46.pdf (investigating decision 
processes in environments where there is time stress due to the opportunity-cost of 
delaying decisions); Rik Pieters, Luk Warlop & Michel Hartog, The Effect of Time 
Pressure and Task Motivation on Visual Attention to Brands, 24 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER 
RES. 281 (1997) (discussing a study of consumer choices under various time pressure 
settings), available at http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=7883. 
 
 39.  See, e.g., Gary T. Ford & Ruth Ann Smith, Inferential Beliefs in Consumer 
Evaluations: An Assessment of Alternative Processing Strategies, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 363, 
370 (1987) (discussing results of a study that shows consumers employ a same-
brand strategy in inference formation); Richard D. Johnson & Irwin P. Levin, More 
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Some inferences may be justified, but others will lead to privacy 
decisions that do not reflect the person’s actual preferences. 
Framing effects may also adversely affect the accuracy of 
decisions.  People tend to process information in a way that is 
consistent with how it was presented to them, accepting it in its 
presented form without questioning the details or inquiring 
further.40  These framing effects are well-known in the marketing 
industry41 and are most pronounced when the cost of accepting a 
particular presentation on its face is perceived to be low.42  Only if 
the cost of acceptance is perceived to be high, or if the information 
is presented in a confusing way, will people discount the form of 
the presentation and seek additional information before making a 
decision.  This is one reason why many links to privacy policies and 
opt-out opportunities contain language such as, “We value your 
 
Than Meets the Eye: The Effect of Missing Information on Purchase Evaluations, 12 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 169 (1985) (exploring the effect of missing information on the 
processes of evaluation and decision making); Birger Wernerfelt, Umbrella 
Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond, 
19 RAND J. ECON. 458 (1988) (discussing “umbrella branding” in which a 
multiproduct firm uses its reputation and established products to introduce a new 
product); Michael D. Smith & Erik Brynjolfsson, Consumer Decision-Making at an 
Internet Shopbot 11 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. Ctr. for eBusiness, Working Paper 
No. 137, 2001) (finding that brand is an important determinant of consumer 
choice), available at http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/137
_erikbinternetshopbots.pdf.  
 40. See James R. Bettman & Michel A. Zins, Information Format and Choice Task 
Effects in Decision Making, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 141, 142 (1979) (“[C]onsumers 
appear to process information in ways congruent with the presentation format, 
processing the information as it is structured, without rearranging it.”); see also 
Paul Slovic, From Shakespeare to Simon: Speculations—and Some Evidence—About Man’s 
Ability to Process Information, 12 OR. RES. INST. 12 (1972) (summarizing research 
experiments on decision making and explaining their implications), available at 
http://www.decisionresearch.org/pdf/dr36.pdf; W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat 
& Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple 
Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465, 477–78 (1987) (describing consumers’ 
responses to risk valuations); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard 
Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 634–36 (1996) 
(citing the frame of reference as one factor that affects the utility of hazard 
warnings). 
 41. See, e.g., Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the 
Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 374 (1988) (discussing the implications of framing effects on 
consumer behavior in marketing products). 
 42. See Eloise Coupey, Restructuring: Constructive Processing of Information 
Displays in Consumer Choice, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 83, 96–97 (1994) (summarizing 
the differing reasons for consumer restructuring). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/9
  
2011] THE FTC’S PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 1741 
privacy,”43 rather than “You are about to divulge information that 
could harm you in the future.  Click here to be sure you want to 
proceed.”  If the presentation form appears safe and 
unthreatening, individuals are less likely to dig beneath the surface 
and determine the strength of the site’s privacy practices for 
themselves. 
Another behavioral tendency is that people overreact to risks 
that are well-known because of news coverage or other events that 
bring the subject to their attention.  Such risks are “available” in 
people’s minds, and they therefore think the matter is important 
enough to make an informed decision.44  Conversely, people tend 
to underreact to risks when they are not in the forefront of the 
mind.  This availability heuristic becomes most relevant when 
people make decisions based on the perceived probability of 
certain events happening.  People underestimate the likelihood of 
certain events occurring if those events do not come to their 
attention very often.  People may underestimate the effects of 
information disclosure and its potential costs if the adverse 
consequences of weak privacy practices come to their attention 
only infrequently.  While there is a fair amount of publicity about 
security leaks and unauthorized access to consumer databases, 
consumers seldom hear about the actual harms resulting from 
those privacy practices.  Hearing about the occasional database 
breach raises a general societal concern about privacy, but we 
seldom hear that any particular consumer problem was traced to a 
specified data breach, or that particular types of information 
disclosure are more dangerous than others.  Thus, while publicity 
can increase the societal concern about information privacy, it does 
not necessarily raise the saliency of privacy in any particular 
decision-making process in our daily lives.  If people do not see a 
particular information disclosure as a risky activity, they will not 
 
 43. See, e.g., We Value Your Privacy, MY WORK BUTTERFLY, 
http://www.myworkbutterfly.com/page/we-value-your-privacy (last visited Feb. 25, 
2011) (containing the privacy policy of Butterfly, a working mothers’ social 
network).  After the “We Value Your Privacy” title and introductory language, the 
policy states that if it acquires or is acquired by another business, the site 
“reserve[s] the right to transfer all of MyWorkButterfly.com’s User information, 
including email addresses, to a separate entity or Platform.”  Id. 
 44. See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (“The purpose of this article is to 
identify a set of interlinked social mechanisms that have important, sometimes 
desirable, but at other times harmful effects on risk regulation.”). 
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invest time and effort deciding whether the disclosure is actually in 
their best interest. 
People are not good at making accurate decisions about low-
probability risks—which are particularly important to privacy 
decisions.  People tend to either overestimate the probability and 
take unnecessary precautions or ignore the risk and do nothing.  
Unless the unlikely occurrence is potentially catastrophic (e.g., the 
slight risk of a home burning causes us to purchase fire insurance), 
we are not willing to invest much time, money, or effort to reduce 
or evaluate a risk we think is not likely to occur.45  People tend to 
view low-probability risks as either safe or unsafe, and overestimate 
or underestimate the likelihood of the event occurring.46  This is 
one reason why some people refuse to reveal personal information 
whenever they are asked to do so, regardless of how harmless it may 
be (e.g., zip code request at a check-out register), while others do 
not think twice before disclosing private information to strangers.  
In addition, people are more likely to make the effort to evaluate 
risks (whether high- or low-probability) if they have prior 
experience with that type of risk.47  Thus, people who have been 
victimized by identity theft may take time to exercise more opt-out 
rights, while those who have not do not bother. 
Finally, if there is immediate and concrete feedback about the 
accuracy of a decision, people tend to spend more effort trying to 
get that decision right.48  Conversely, if feedback about the accuracy 
of a decision is delayed or never comes, less effort is made to make 
 
 45. Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze & Don L. Coursey, Insurance for 
Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY 95, 109 (1993) (concluding that “[i]ndividuals appear either to 
dismiss low-probability risks . . . or to worry about the risk [too] much”). 
 46. For example, when asked about the risks of lung cancer to smokers, both 
smokers and nonsmokers generally overestimate the risk.  W. Kip Viscusi et al., 
Smoking Risks in Spain: Part III—Determinants of Smoking Behavior 2 (Harv. Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 306, Nov. 2000), 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/306.pdf. 
 47. See Bettman, Luce & Payne, supra note 35, at 188 (“People are most likely 
to have well-articulated preferences when they are familiar and experienced with 
the preference object, and rational choice theory may be most applicable in such 
situations.”). 
 48. See id. at 193 (listing one of the most important goals for consumer 
decision making is maximizing the accuracy of the choice); see also Hillel J. 
Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 1, 2 (Thomas S. Wallsten 
ed., 1980) (noting “outcome feedback” is the main source of information for 
evaluating the quality of decision making). 
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a decision that best fits our interests.  This is important because the 
correctness of any decision about revealing personal information 
usually will not be apparent until long after the transaction has 
ended or, more likely, never.  Only rarely will someone be able to 
trace the spam, identity theft, profiling, pop-up advertisement, junk 
mail, or other effects of information sharing to a particular data 
collector’s privacy practices.  Without feedback on our decisions 
about disclosing information, we have no way of knowing whether 
our decisions were good or bad.  If the results of the decision will 
likely never be known, we do not invest much time trying to make 
the right choice.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the last few years, much has changed about the way people 
reveal personal information.  Today, a vast number of individuals 
access information from portable laptops, handheld phones, e-
readers, and other devices at all hours of the day, from land, air, 
and sea locations throughout the world.  Whether we are 
interacting on social networks or researching the latest news story 
online, we are constantly giving and receiving information about 
ourselves, whether knowingly or not.  It is not surprising that firms 
have developed technologies and business plans that use our 
information in ways that were unimaginable a short time ago.  
The FTC should be commended for issuing the Proposed 
Framework.  In particular, the FTC’s foundational principles of 
“privacy by design,” if they are more than hopeful aspirations, may 
lead to meaningful substantive controls on the collection and use 
of personal information in the years to come.  The Proposed 
Framework states that protecting privacy online should be the 
default position, information should only be collected and stored 
as needed, privacy should be protected throughout the information 
life cycle, and privacy practices should be designed with respect for 
individual interests from the start.49  If these principles are widely 
adopted, companies will build applications that only gather and 
share information as needed, and they will build in privacy 
protections with individual users in mind.  This would be a 
fundamental shift, but without legal mandates, one wonders 
 
 49. See generally PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 1 (calling on companies 
and policymakers to promote consumer privacy, simplified consumer choice, and 
greater transparency of data practices). 
17
Nehf: The FTC's Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A Mov
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
1744 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
whether it will actually happen. 
If the substantive controls of “privacy by design” are not widely 
adopted (e.g., if the FTC does not undertake an aggressive 
enforcement program to ensure adoption), all that remains in the 
Proposed Framework is an enhanced notice and choice regime that 
requires us to police our own privacy interests in situations where 
we are increasingly ill-equipped to do so.  No matter how clear, 
conspicuous, and timely privacy notices and opt-out opportunities 
may be, people will seldom make decisions that accurately reflect 
their privacy preferences.  Insurmountable problems regarding the 
transparency of privacy and data aggregation practices, the inability 
to hold firms accountable for harms caused by maintaining 
suboptimal privacy practices, and the practical realities and 
behavioral tendencies of individuals making decisions about 
privacy matters in an online environment all render even an 
enhanced notice and choice approach to privacy wholly ineffectual.  
If the FTC is serious about privacy protection, it will move 
aggressively to ensure that the substantive controls in its “privacy by 
design” initiative become the norm and abandon the outdated 
notion that personal information can be adequately protected by 
disclosure and individual decision making.   
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